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Who will watch the managers? Corporate America never
has settled on an answer. It has been the unsolved riddle,

the missing link in the corporate chain, even long before
Dwayne 0. Andreas [CEO and chair of Archer-DanielsMid/and] became a poster boy for reformers. . . . If you
want to motivate [directors], make them responsible, i.e.

guarantee that besmirchment will be the reward for being
asleep at the switch.

- Roger Lowenstein 1
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The boards of directors of a number of America's largest corporations,
with household names like American Express, General Motors,
International Business Machines, K-Mart, and Westinghouse, have
recently responded to poor corporate performance by essentially
declaring, "Off with their heads!" and firing their chief executive officers
("CEOs").2 In many instances, the removal of CEOs has been associat~
ed with a significant increase in shareholder wealth.3 However, boards
of directors frequently allow CEOs to engage in activities that destroy
shareholder wealth and waste valuable corporate resources before they
remove these individuals.4 As a result, if boards of directors in these
situations had fired their company's CEOs earlier or taken other
corrective action, they may have been able to avoid the loss of
significant shareholder wealth.5
The positive relationship between a company's corporate governance
policies and the likelihood that the board will remove an
underperforming CEO has attracted increasing attention to these
policies.6 By focusing on corporate governance issues pertinent to the
companies in whlch they invest, institutional investors, such as the
California Public Employees' Retirement Fund ("CalPERS''), 7 the
largest public pension fund in the United States with assets in excess of
$.95.5 billion, have found that they can significantly enhance their
investment returns. 9 As a result, institutional investors have placed

2. See David. J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Performance Changes Following Top
Management Dismissals, 50 J. OF FIN. 1029 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest,Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strateqyfor Dealing
with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. R.Ev. 857, 882•900 (1993).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 107•254.
5. See, e.g., A Survey ofCorporate Governance: Watching the Boss, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 29, 1994, at 3 (stating "there is ample evidence of waste that might have been
avoided had bosses been on a tighter rein.").
6. Commentators have argued that the "acid test" of a company's corporate
governance policies is the willingness of its board of directors to fire an underperfonning
CEO. Grundfest, supra note 3, at 877 (citing Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest
Proposal/or Improved Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 66 (1992)).
7. See, e.g., CalPERS Issues Governance Report Cards, IRRC CORP. GOVER·
NANCE BULL., Apr.-June 1995 (describing how Cal PERS graded its 300 largest portfolio
companies based on their responses to its corporate governance survey).
8. Stan Hinden, The Case of the Unretiring Shareholder, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
1996 (Washington Business section) at 27.
9. See, e.g., Steven L. Nesbitt, Long•Tenn Rewards from Shareholder Activ~m:
A Study of the "CalPERS Effect," CONTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Winter 1994, at 75. See also Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional
Investors: Evidence from Ca/PERS, 51 J. OF FIN., 227, 244-48 (1996) (shareholder
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increasing importance on corporate governance related activities. In
response to the increasing interest of institutional investors in this area,
publicly traded comfanies in the United States have prioritized corporate
governance issues. 1
Although certain companies have made significant improvements with
respect to corporate governance issues, others have not adequately
addressed these issues. 11 As a result, a number of commentators have
made corporate governance proposals12 that, if implemented, would
significantly change the status quo. 13 For example, some commentators, including former Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") Harold Williams 14 and Mary Shapiro, 15 and
Professor Jay Lorsch of the Harvard Business School,16 have recommended that a company should not permit a single individual to serve
as both its CEO and chairperson of its board of directors ("chair").
Alternatively, if a company allows a single individual to serve as its
CEO and chair, Lorsch and Martin Lipton of the law firm Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, among others, have asserted that a company's
board of directors should select a senior independent director to lead the
independent directors. 17

wealth increased for targeted finns that adopted Ca!PERS's shareholder resolutions or
made changes sufficient to warrant a settlement with Ca!PERS but declined for finns
that resisted change; no statistically significant change in operating perfonnance was
found across firms).
10. See, e.g., GENERAL MOTORS CORP., GENERAL MOTORS' BOARD GulDELINES
ON SIGNIACANT CORPORATE GoVERNANCE ISSUES (1994) (describing the position of
General Motors on twenty-eight corporate governance issues).
11. Lowenstein, supra note I, at CI.
12. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REY. 863, 865 (1991).
13. See, e.g., John Daly & Julie Cazzin, A Collision Course: GM Directors
Overthrow Their Chairman and Take Control of a Troubled Corporate Giant,

MACLEAN'S, Nov. 9, 1992, at 90.
14. See Harold M. Williams & Irving S. Shapiro, The 1979 Benjamin F. Fairless
Memorial Lectures, Power and Accountability: The Changing Role of the Corporate
Board 18 (Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1979).
15. See Robert Sanford, SEC Official Favors Shaking Up Boardrooms, ST. Lorns
DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1993, at SC.
16. JAY W. lORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 184-87 (1989).
I 7. See, e.g., Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 6, at 70. Ira M. Millstein of the law
finn Weil, Gotshal & Manges proposed designating an outside director for a board
leadership role in 1990. Ira M. Millstein, Corporate Governance in the 1990's, Address
to the Harvard University School of Government (Apr. 10, 1990). He had previously
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This Article proposes that the New York Stock Ex.change (''NYSE")
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (''NASD") amend
their listing policies to require a listed company, in the case of the
NYSE, and a NASDAQ/NM$ company, in the case of the NASO, to
disclose in its proxy statement {l) whether or not there is a separate
independent chair, and if there is not, (2) whether or not its board of
directors has designated a senior independent director who :functions as
a leader of its independent directors ("lead director"). For this purpose,
a director would not be considered independent were he or she either the
retired CEO or not otherwise deemed independent, applying the
definitions used in the NYSE and NASO mies requiring an audit
committee consisting solely of independent directors. 18
Our proposal would not require a company to separate the roles of
CEO and chair or to designate a lead director. Rather, our proposal
would allow a company to select the board leadership structure that it
considers optimal. However, if that structure did not include a separate
independent chair or lead director, the directors would be required to
explain in the proxy statement why they believe it to be in the best
interests of the company and its shareholders to have a single individual
act as its CEO and chair, or to have a retired CEO or other nonindependent person as chair, without the appointment of an independent
lead director. 19
These proposals are designed to encourage directors to select an
independent chair or a lead director, thereby increasing the likelihood
that a company's independent directors will not be beholden to the CEO
and that a company's independent directors will actively monitor and
evaluate the performance of the CEO and the company on an on-going

proposed separating the roles of CEO and chair. Winthrop Knowlton & Ira M. Millstein,
Can the Board of Directors Help the American Corporation Earn the Immortality It
,Holds So Dear? in JOID,1' R. MEYER & JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, THE U.S. BUSlNESS
CORPORATION: AN INSTITUTION IN TRANSISTION 186 (1988),
18. The status of independent directors would be detennined in accordance with
the definitions used in the NYSE and NASD rules requiring an audit committee
consisting solely of independent directors. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY
MANUAL § 303.00 (An audit committee sha11 be "comprised solely of directors
independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of its
Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a
committee member."). See also NASO MANUAL § 5(c), (CCH) "i[ 1812, at 1579
("[I]ndependent director shall mean a p-erson other than an officer or employee of the
company or its subsidiaries or any other individual having a relationship which, in the
opinion of the board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.").
19. Such a rule change would have to be approved by the SEC pursuant to
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. §78s(b) (1995), and Rule 19-4
promulgated thereunder. 17 C.F.R. §240.19b-4 (1995).
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basis. Implementation of these proposals would enhance the ability of
a company's board of directors to make mid-course corrections rather
than waiting until the company is in a crisis to act. The use of the
listing requirements as an instrument for change provides a practical and
easy way to promote the consideration by publicly traded companies of
board leadership structure and methods for improving it, without
requiring the SEC to amend its proxy rules or states to amend· their
corporation laws. 20
This Article consists of five parts. Part II will discuss the rationale for
our proposal. This part will analyze the existing board leadership
structure and practices in the United States. Part II will also explore the
impact that the separation of a company's CEO and chair positions and
the appointment of a lead director would have on corporate accountability.
Part ill will summarize a recent study, the findings of which suggest
that independent directors have no effect on corporate performance as
measured by stock price. This part will then discllss the recent research
on the relationship between a company separating its chair and CEO
positions and its performance in the United States and the United

Kingdom.
Part IV

will

review

specific

examples

of management

underperformance in publicly traded U.S. companies. These examples
will demonstrate that many independent directors wait until the company
is in crisis before removing an underperforming CEO and adopting the
board practices needed to prevent the abuses of power that resulted from
the CEO's dominance. This part will focus on well-publicized corporate
crises, such as the recent allegations of wrongdoing by officers at
Archer-Daniels-Midland and precipitous losses at Morrison Knudsen, and
will analyze the confluence of power in these situations within a single
individual. Moreover, this part will utilize the recent corporate
governance initiatives at General Motors to illustrate how a company can
C

20. Listing requirements have h een used before to promote improved COIJ)orate
governance and responsibility. For example, the NYSE changed its rules in 1977 to
require each domestic company with common stock listed on the NYSE to establish and
maintain an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors. See NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL §303.00, approved by the SEC in In re New
York Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No, 13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977). The NASD
subsequently imposed the same requirement on NASDAQ/NMS issuers. See NASD
MANUAL§ S(D), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) iJ 1812, at 1579.
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dramatically improve its corporate governance practices and in doing so
create shareholder value. Lastly, Part IV will discuss the separation of
the roles of CEO and chair at Compaq Computer to illustrate how a
company with a separate CEO and chair was able to change course prior
to reaching a corporate crisis.
Part V will conclude by discussing the anticipated effect of the
implementation of this Article's proposal.
II.

THE RATIONALE FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF
BOARD LEADERSHIP PROPOSAL

Our proposal involves the use of proxy disclosure as a means of
promoting thoughtful consideration of board leadership structure, with
the expectation that it will cause more companies to improve that
structure by designating an independent chair or a lead director. The use
of proxy disclosure as a means of inducing change has been used in the
past in the United States.
For example, in 1992, the SEC changed the executive compensation
disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K and made further related
changes to Schedule 14A and Form 10-K in an attempt to forci;: directors
to pay more attention to the area of executive compensation and the
relationship between executive pay and corporate performance.21 For
the first time, the SEC required public companies to include in their
proxy statement a report from the compensation committee (or the full
board if there is no compensation committee) explaining how executive
compensation was set and the relationship, if any, between corporate
performance and executive compensation.22 To facilitate a ready
comparison of pay and performance, the SEC standardized disclosure of
the total compensation (including stock options) provided to certain top
executives and required the inclusion of "performance graphs" comparing a company's returns to its shareholders with the returns of the
market as a whole and their specific industries.23

21. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962,
Ex.change Act Release No. 31,327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032, 57
Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249), as
corrected ln Executive Compensation Disclosure, Correction, Securities Act Release No.
6966, Exchange Act Release No. 31,420, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,085,
57 Fed. Reg. 53,985 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 228) [hereinafter Executive
Compensation Disclosure]. For a more detailed discussion of these changes and the
forces that played a role in the SEC's actions, see Tracy Scott Johnson, Pay for
Perfonnance: Corporate Executive Compensation in the 1990s, 20 DEL. J, CORP, L. 183
(1995).
22. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 21.
23. Id.
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Similarly, our proposal would require NASDAQ and NYSE companies
to disclose in their proxy statements their existing board leadership
structure and their rationale for having such a structure. By requiring
companies with neither an independent chair nor a lead director to
explain why they do not consider it to be in the best interests of the
company and its shareholders to do so, our proposal will provide an
impetus for directors to select an independent chair or a lead director,
thereby improving corporate governance. Thus, our proposal falls
squarely within the U.S. tradition of using proxy disclosure as a means
to induce enhanced corporate and directorial responsibility.
Although this proposal would represent a significant change from the
status quo in the United States, precedent in the United Kingdom
("U.K.") supports it. The Report of the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance ("Cadbury Report"),24 which Sir
Adrian Cadbury chaired, stated that in principle the roles of CEO and
chair should be separate,25 but did not mandate a split. Instead the
Code of Best Practice included in the Cadbury Report (the "Code of
Best Practice") provides that if the roles are combined then there must
be a strong and independent element on the board with a recognized
senior member.26 The London Stock Exchange ("LSE'') adopted as a
requirement the Cadbury Report's recommendation27 that every listed
company domiciled in the United Kingdom disclose in its annual report
whether it is in compliance with the Code of Best Practice and explain
any areas of non~compliance. 28 Thus, every affected company must
disclose whether the same person serves as CEO and chair, and, if so,
whether there is a strong and independent element on the board with a

24.

COMMITIEE ON THE FINANClAL AsPECTS OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE, THE

FINANCIAL AsPECTS OF CORPORA1E- GoVERNANCE (1992) [hereinafter CADBURY
REPORT].
25. Id. at 21.
26. Paragraph 1.2 of the Code of Best Practice provides:
There should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the bead of
a company, which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no
one individual has unfettered powers of decision. Where the chairperson is
also the chief executive, it is essential that there should be strong and
independent element on the board, with a recognized senior member.
Id. at 58.
27. Id. at 17.
28. LoNOON STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING REQUIREMENTS § 12.43(j) {1995).
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recognized senior member.2si Any U.K. company that has a single
individual serve as CEO and chair but no strong and independent
element on the board, with a recognized senior member, must explain
why it does not split the roles of CEO and chair or appoint a lead
director.30
29. Id. In mid•l995, the LSE proposed to limit the required certification to just
two aspects of the Code of Best Practice included in the Cadbury Report: (1) the
auditor's certification of the company's going concern status and (2) the directors'
certification of the adequacy of internal controls. Shareholder activists, however,
strongly opposed such a change. & a result, it seems unlikely that the LSE will modify
this requirement before the successor to the Committee on the Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance issues its report, which is not expected before 1997. See Norma
Cohen, A Taste for Cadbury, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at 19. See also Robert Bruce,
Slow Journey Ahead for Cadbury Mark II, LoNDON TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
30. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING REQUIREMENTS § 12.430) (1995), The
LSE disclosure requirement applies to any reporting periods ending after June 30, 1993.
REroRT OF TIIE COMMITIEE ON THE FINANCIAL AsPECTS OF CORPORATE 00VERNANCE:
COMPLIANCE wrrn THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE 9 (1995). In the period from that date

until December 31, 1994, the majority of the largest 1,550 companies listed on the LSE
(based on market capitalization) split the roles of CEO and chair. Id. at 16. A majority
of the companies that combined the roles bad a lead director. The distribution by
company size, starting with the 100 companies with the largest market capitalization,
was as follows:

'"'
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The Toronto Stock Exchange ("TSE") bas adopted a similar proposal.
The TSE has promulgated a set of guidelines pertaining to corporate
governance and requires companies that do not comply with these
guidelines to explain their non~compliance.31 One of the TSE corporate
governance guidelines provides in pertinent part:
Every board of directors should have in place appropriate structures and
procedures to ensure that the board can function independently of management
An appropriate structure would be to (i) appoint a chair of the board who is not
a member of management with responsibility to ensure the board discharges its
responsibilities or (ii) adopt alternate means such as assigning this responsibility
to a committee of the board, such as the governance committee, or to a director,
sometimes referred to as the "lead director."n

The existence of a separate chair within a company would reduce the
CEO's ability to unduly influence and control the board of directors. 33
Commentators have noted that the concentration of power in a single
individual, who is a company's CEO and chair, has been a factor in
most recent "corporate disasters."34 If a company has separate individuals serving as the CEO and as the chair, the independent directors will
have a recognized leader to guide their performance of such critical tasks
as evaluating the CEO, setting executive compensation, and conducting
succession planning for the CEO and other members of top management.
After consultation with the CEO, a separate chair would also set the
agendas for board meetings and preside over boa:rd meetings, thereby
controlling the timing and pace of board discussions. 35 Along with the

Id. In contrast, a single individual serves as the CEO and the chair in more than 75%
of U.S. companies. JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A S1UDY OF
CORPORATE GoVERNANCE IN FlvE COUNTRIES, 184 (1994).
31. TORONTO STOCK ExCHANGE CORP. CoMM. 4-20 (1995).
32. Id. at 4-21 to 4-22.
33. The reasoning presented in favor of this proposition has been significantly
influenced by LoRSCH & MACIVER, supra note 16.
34. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE ROUNDTABLE 6 (1995) (''In nearly every recent, major corporate disaster there
was one very powerful individual, always the chair and chief executive, but in some
cases, chair, chief executive, and a major shareholder as well."). The NACD Blue
Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism recommended that boards consider
formally designating a non-executive chair or other independent board leader. NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, REPORT OF TIIE NACD BLUE RIBBON
COMJ-DSSION ON DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM 4 (1996).
35. Former SEC Chairman Harold Williams stated that the CEO should not also
be chair because "[c]ontrol of the agenda and pace of the meeting is a powerful control."
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other directors, a separate chair would also be active in establishing the
qualifications for board membership,36 interviewing candidates, and
selecting new directors. 37 Moreover, having a chair who is not also the
company's CEO would encourage the directors to enga/§e in< more open
discussions about current problems and practices.3
Lastly, the
existence of a separate chair serves as a reminder to the CEO that he or
she reports to, and serves at the pleasure of, the company's board of
directors.39
Many executives in the United States oppose the idea of splitting the
two roles of CEO and chair.40 In the United States, promotion to CEO
and chair is often viewed as a reward for excellent service and a vote of
confidence by the board. 41 Moreover, in the United States, the majority
of Fortune 500 companies allow a single individual to serve as their

Judith H. Dobrzynski, Chairman and CEO: One Hat Too Many, Bus. WK., Nov. 18,
1991, at 124.
36. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE AND AMERICAN
COMPETITIVENESS I 1-12 (1990).
37. See THE WORKING GROUP ON CoRl'ORATE GoVERNANCE, A New Compact for
Owners and Directors, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1991, at 532, 534.
38. This phenomenon occurred at GM after the roles of CEO and chair were split.
According to executive vice-president and director Hany Pearce, Paul O'Neil, a GM
board member who is also CEO of Alcoa, "is absolutely uninhibited in challenging
numbers and our analytical approach-that didn't happen in the past. The signals
suggested that_it was unseemly behavior to ask questions or to delve into details." Judith
H. Dobrzynski, Jack and John: 2 for the Road at G.M., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, §3,
·at 11.
39. See LORSCH & MAcIVER, supra note 16.
As part of its annual survey of directors, the executive search finn Kom/Feny
International asked directors to answer the following question: "[l]n what way would the
authority of the CEO be limited as a result of separating the two functions [CEO and
chair] or in what way has it been limited if already separated?" KORN/FERRY
INTERNATIONAL, 22ND ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STIJDY 26 (1995). The majority
of directors indicated that the separation of the CEO and chair roles would result 1n the
CEO exercising less control over board meetings, agendas, committee assignments, and
the selection of new directors. Id. Moreover, the majority of outside directors indicated
that the separation of the roles would reduce the CEO's feeling of"owning the board."
Id.
40. According to a 1992 survey conducted by Kom/Feny Intemational, 41% of
CEOs believe that separating the roles of CEO and chair would impede management
effectiveness. Joann S. Lublin, ManagemenJ.• Shareholders Campaign to Diffuse Power
of ChiefExecutives by Splitting Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., Apr. l, 1992, at Bl, Moreover,
only 25% of the 653 CEOs surveyed by the National Association of Corporate
Executives favored a required separation of the CEO and chair roles. Id. See also
Dobrzynski, supra note 38, at 11 ("I.B.M. 's Louis V. Gerstner Jr. and Allied Signal's
Lawrence A. Bossidy are among many who have insisted on having both the chairman
and C.E.O. titles before talcing top jobs,"),
41. James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Leadership StroclUre: On the Separation
ofthe Positions of CEO and Chairman ofthe Board, Working Paper FR 96-04, William
E. Simon Graduate School of Business. University of Rochester (1995) (on file with the
authors).
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CEO and chair.42 In most of the companies in the United States that
split the roles, the person serving as chair is a former CE0.43 Even if
a company decides that having a separate independent chair is not in its
best interests, a company can realize many of the advantages of
separating the aforementioned two positions, if its independent directors
appoint an independent senior member to serve as lead director.
The lead director should be independent of management, which means
that he or she should not be the retired CEO, who often has hand-picked
the present CE0.44 The lead director should also not be affiliated with
any firm (such as a customer, supplier, bank, law firm, or consulting
firm) that does any material amount of business with the company. To
avoid entrenchment and undue affiliation with management, it would be
appropriate to impose a limit on the number of consecutive years a
person can serve as lead director; a five-year limit would be reasonable.
A company's lead director would function as the leader of the
independent directors. In this capacity, the lead director would be able
to take an active role in a number of areas of vital importance to the
company. For example, Lipton and Lorsch have proposed that the lead
director should be actively involved in the following matters: selecting
board committee members and chairs; setting board meeting agendas;
ensuring the adequacy of information that directors receive; and
enhancing the effectiveness of the board meeting process. 45
The lead director would have the power to convene special and regular
meetings of the independent directors, without management present, and
would chair such meetings. By having the independent directors meet
on a regular basis, the lead director can demonstrate to the CEO that
having the independent directors meet in a session without management
is not necessarily a sinister event indicating that the independent
directors are displeased with management and are contemplating firing

42. In a 1996 swvey of over 1,000 directors, only 19% of the respondents
indicated their companies had a non-executive chair. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL,
23RD ANNuAL BOARD OF DIREcroRS SnmY 23 (1996). In addition, three percent of
the directors surveyed indicated their boards were considering splitting the functions of
CEO and chair. Id. Of the directors who served on the boards of companies that had
a single individual as CEO and chair, only 27% indicated their boards had a lead
director. Id,
43. KoRNIFERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 39, at 20.
44. The comments within this paragraph are also applicable to companies that have
a non-executive chair.
45. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 6, at 70.
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the CEO. A separation of the :functions would also increase the
likelihood that the board would consider alternative viewpoints and
courses of action besides those supported by the CEO and chair.
In addition to increasing the efficacy of routine activities engaged in
by a board of directors, a lead director would also be an invaluable asset
to a company's other directors in a time of crisis. For example, in the
event of the sudden death or incapacity of a company's CEO, a lead
director who is a recognized leader on the board of directors could step
in and serve as a liaison between the board and the remaining members
of management.46 By conducting regular meetings of independent
directors, the lead director also strengthens the relationship among the
independent directors and enables them to function more effectively in
a time of crisis.
In many boardrooms today, there is already an independent director
who is recognized by the management and the independent directors as
a leader.47 Some have argued that selecting an independent director as
the leader of the independent directors will "simply legitimate this
role.'..is Publicly identifying a person as the leader of the independent
directors may also further the goal of providing greater accountability for
the company's performance. The Wall Street Journal already regularly
includes a box naming all of the directors in its articles on corporate
disasters.49 Without a publicly identified leader, it is difficult for the
shareholders and the public to hold any particular independent director
accountable. On the other hand, if the leader of the independent
directors is publicly identified, it is more likely that the leader will be
singled out for criticism.so Fear of this criticism and the resultant loss
of reputation can be a powerful incentive for conscientious board
service.s 1 As such, publicly designating a lead director provides a

46. Jay W. Lorsch & Martin Lipton, On The Leading Edge: The Lead Director,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 79.
47. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 6, at 71.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Scott Kilman et al., An Executive Becomes Informant for the FBI.
Stunning Giant ADM, WALL ST. J,, July 10, 1995, at Al, A6; Joan E. Rigdon, William
Agee Will Leave Morrison Knudsen, WALL ST. J., Feb, 2, 1995, at Bl, B10.
50. See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at Cl ("If you want to motivate [outside
directors], make them responsible, i.e. guarantee that besmirchment will be the reward
for being asleep at the switch.").
51. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, ANO
MANAGEMENT 258 {1992) ("[A}n agent whose business opportunities lie with a small
group of principals who communicate among themselves must wony that actions that
damage his or her reputation will result in the loss of a large volume of possible
business."). See also Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social Context
of Judgment and Choice, in 7 REs. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 297, 308 (LL.
Cummings & Bany M. Staw eds., 1985) (According to H.L. Zetterberg, "[t]he
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counter-weight to the often prevailing board culture and norms whereby
directors avoid confrontation and only give advice when and if asked by
the CEO. considering it "bad form" to push uninvited company
business.52
We acknowledge that serving as an independent chair or lead director
is a big job. To provide a positive incentive to undertake such a role,
the company should be prepared to provide the independent chair or lead
director extra compensation commensurate with the time, effort, and
responsibility involved.53 This will, for many companies, be an added
cost of separating the roles or appointing a lead director.54

ill. THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND BOARD
LEADERSHIP STRUCTIJRE ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
This part will discuss a recent study, the findings of which suggest
that American corporations need to do more than just place independent
directors on their boards to increase shareholder wealth via their
corporate governance activities. This part will then analyze the recent
research on the relationship between corporate performance and board
leadership structure in the United States and the United Kingdom.

A.

The Bhagat & Black Study on Independent Directors

Over the past twenty years, the boards of U.S. public companies have
undergone a dramatic change in composition.55 Twenty years ago.
inside directors, i.e. persons who were company officers or relatives of

maximization of favorable attitudes from others [isJ the counterpart in sociological theory
to the maximization of profit in economic theocy.'').
52. William T. Allen, Corporate Directors in the Dawning Age of Post-Materialism: New Problems and New Solutions, Address at the Stanford University Center for
Economic Policy Research Conference on Corporate Governance (May I, 1992).
53. General Motors, for example. paid independent chair John Smale $300,000 in
1993.
54. For a further discussion of costs involved in splitting the roles of CEO and
chair, see Brickley, et al., supra note 41, at 7-11.
55. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 81 I, 840-41 (1992) (''Twenty years ago, many public
company boards were controlled by insiders; today, almost all have a majority of outside
directors, and many have a majority of independent directors ... .'').
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officers,56 controlled many U.S. public companies' boards; today,
however, independent directors, i.e. persons who have no compan17
related business dealings and are not former company officers, 7
comprise the majority of directors of many U.S. public companies.58
The increasing number of independent directors on U.S. companies'
boards can be seen as a response to the widely accepted belief that
increasing the representation of independent directors on a company's
board will improve its performance.59 As the performance of U.S.
companies lagged behind that of their foreign competitors in the 1980s,
many commentators argued that to compete successfully with their
foreign competitors, U.S. companies needed to change their corporate
governance practices.60 A central tenet of many corporate governance
reform proposals espoused in the 1980s was that U.S. companies needed
to place more independent directors on their boards to improve their
performance.61 A recently conducted unpublished study by Professor
Sanjai Bhagat of the University of Colorado Graduate School of
Business and Professor Bernard Black of Columbia. Law School suggests
that U.S. companies must do more than just place independent directors
on their boards to increase shareholder wealth via their corporate
governance activities.62
The study represented the first large-scale, long~time-horizon analysis
of the effect of independent directors on corporate performance,63
Bhagat and Black analyzed the stock price and accounting performance
of 950 large U.S. companies between 1983 and 1993.64 The authors
selected the 950 companies from the Institutional Shareholder Services
database, which is comparable to the Fortune 500 database but more
inclusive in that it includes companies outside of the areas of manufacturing and mining.65
The study found that the proportion of independent directors on a
company's board "has no consistent effect on market~adjusted stock

56. THE IS$ PROXY VOTING MANuAL 96-100 (R. Monks et al. eds., Institutional
Shareholder Servs., 2d ed. 1991).
57. Id.
58. Black, supra note 55, at 841.
59. Id.
60. Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: Wlzen Do
Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. LQ. 327,328 (1996).
61. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE (1994).
62. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, Do Independent Directors Matter? (Working
Paper, 1996) (on file with the authors).
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id.
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price performance."66 Moreover, the study found no evidence that the
proportion of independent directors on a company's board positivezaffects its performance across a wide range of accountings measures. 7
The study's :findings suggest that independent directors, on average and
over time, do not add any more value to the boards on which they serve
than that which is added by non-independent directors. One possible
explanation for this finding is that independent directors are capable of
adding value only if they serve on boards with the appropriate board
leadership structure. As a result, this study can be seen as suggesting
that American companies need to focus on board leadership structure if
they are to increase shareholder wealth through changes in their
corporate governance.

B.

Recent Research on Board Leadership Structure
in the United States

The relationship between U.S. companies separating their chair and
CEO positions and their performance has been the subject of only three
recently published studies. This section will provide an overview of
these three studies. We will also summarize the results of one unpublished study.
A 1991 study analyzed the performance of 250 randomly selected
Fortune 500 companies between 1978 and 1983.68 The study's
objective was to compare the multi-year financial performance of
companies that had one individual serve as their chair and CEO and
those that separated their chair and CEO positions.69 The study
removed companies that changed their structure during the study. As a
result, the study's sample consisted of 141 companies, thirty of which
had separated their chair and CEO positions during the period from 1978
to 1983.70 The study found that during each of the years between 1978
and 1983, the companies that separated their chair and CEO positions
had significantly higher average returns on investment, average returns
on equity, and average profit margins than their counterparts that

66.
67.
68.

Id.
Bhagat & Black, supra note 62, at 3.
Paula L. Rechner & Dan R. Dalton, CEO Duality and Organizational
Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155 (1991).
69. Id. at 156.
70.

Id.
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combined their chair and CEO positions.71 These findings resulted in
the study concluding that companies with separate chair and CEO

positions "consistently outperformed" companies with a single individual
serving as chair and CE0.72
A 1993 study analyzed the effect of board leadership structure within
the banking industry.73 This study analyzed the performance between
1988 and 1990 of a yearly average of 112 banks, nineteen of which on
average had a non-chair CEO.74 The study found that cost efficiency
and return on assets are lower for banks where an individual serves as
chair and CEO than banks that separate the chair and CEO positions.75
The study concluded that «on average banks where the CEO is also the
chairman of the board u.ndeierform those banks where the CEO is not
the chairman of the board."7
A 1996 study examined the relationship between corporate performance and board leadership structure.77 This study analyzed each of
the Fortune 500 companies as defined at the end of 1990 and then
classified them based on their chair and CEO status for each year
between 1986 and 1991.78 Companies that did not use standard
managerial titles were removed from the study. As a result, on average,
375 companies were studied for each year.79 Of the companies studied
only twelve had total "nonduality," i.e., they had a separate chair and
CEO for each year.80 This study found that the stock market is
unaffected by a company's announcement indicating that it will allow
one individual to serve as chair and CEO or separate its chair and CEO
positions.81 Moreover, this study also found that "there is no difference
in performance between firms with total nonduality during the period
and firms with total "duality" [i.e., firms that bad a CEO/chair for each
year] ....

'"'

Id. at 158•59.
Id. at 155.
Lynn Pi & Stephen G. Timme, Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency, 11 J.
OF BANKmG AND FlN. 515 (1993).
74. Id. at 522.
15. id. at 529.
76. Id.
77. B. Ram Baliga et al., CEO Duality and Firm Pe,formance: What's the Fuss?,
17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41 (1996).
78. Id. at 44-45.
19. Id.
80. Id.
31. Id. at 47.
32. Baglia et al., supra note 77, at 49-50.
71.
72.
73.
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An unpublished 1995 study examined the relationship between board
leadership structure and accounting performance.83 This study analyzed
661 finns from the 1989 Forbes survey of executive compensation, and
then classified them based on their chair and CEO status at the end of
1988.84 Of the 661-company sample, 535 combined the roles of CEO
and chair, ninety-three split the roles, and thirty-three had no chair.85
This study compared accounting perfonnance for the two subsamples
(the 535 companies that combined the roles and the ninety-three that
split them) for 1988 and the period from 1989 to 1991. It found that
median return on capital in 1988 was higher in firms that combined the
roles than in those that split them. 86 Over the period from 1989 to
1991, each subgroup earned essentially the same return on capital.87
Stock return for the two subgroups in 1988 was not significantly
different under one statistical test but was under another.88 Over the
period from 1989 to 1991, the median stoc~ return for firms combining
the roles was substantially larger than the median stock return of firms
that split the roles. 89 When the study compared accqunting and market
returns adjusted by industry medians, the differences in both periods
across the two subgroups "generally [w~e] insignificant.',90 This study
also found that "changes in leadership structure have no systematic
effects on stock prices."91
The authors of this study noted that "changes in leadership structure
might convey information to the market about cash flows even if the
structure itself does not affect performance,',92 and stated that "[t]he
potential for these types of secondary information effects confounds the
interpretation of our results." 93 This caution appears well-placed given
the authors' proposition, that in the United States, elevating the CEO to
the combined roles of CEO and chair is usually ~ reward for good past

83.

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.

91.

92.
93.

Brickley et al., supra note 4 I.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27.
Brickley et al., supra note 41, at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 33.
Brickley et al., supra note 41, at 34.
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performance and a vote of confidence.94 If this is true, then we would
expect the market to interpret an announcement that the roles are to be
split as an indication that the CEO's performance has not been good,
thereby signaling that future cash flows may be lower than the market
had expected.
The studies, taken together, suggest that at best separating the roles of
chair and CEO positively impacts performance, and at worst it has no
effect on performance. As a result, splitting the roles of chair and CEO
might be compared to chicken soup: Can't hurt, might help. 95 The
lack of definitive empirical data means that we must rely on logic and
reason together with anecdotal evidence to support our proposal. The
logic has been presented in Part II and can be summarized as follows:
The function of the chairman is to run board meetings and oversee the process
of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO • • • • Without the
direction of an independent leader, it is much more difficult for the board to
perfonn its critical function. Therefore, for the board to be effective, it is
important to separate the CEO and chairman positions. 95

The anecdotal evidence is presented in Part N.

C.

Recent Research on Board Leadership Structure
in the United Kingdom

The relationship between U.K. companies separating their chair and
CEO positions and their performance has been the subject of one
recently published study.97 This section will provide an overview of
this study.
This shldy analyzed 124 U.K. companies that announced a change in
their board leadership structure between January of 1989 and December
of 1992.98 For a company to be included in the survey, it had to
announce that it intended to separate, maintain, or create the dual
positions of CEO and chair, and the Financial Times had to mention this
announcement. 99 In addition, companies that had a confounding event,
such as the declaration of a dividend within three days of a board

94. Id. at 25.
95. For an analysis of this type of argument in a different context, see Grundfest,
supra note 3, at 868.
96. Michael C. Jensen, Presidential Address: The Modem Industrial Revolution,
Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. OF FIN. 831, 866 (1993).
97. J. Dabya et al., The Case for Separating the Roles of Chairman and CEO: An
Analysis of Stock Market and Accounting Data, 4 CORP. GoVERNANCE 71 (1996).
98. Id. at 73.
99. Id.
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leadership announcement. were excluded from the study.100 As a
result, the study only analyzed the effect of seventy-six companies•
announcements. 101
The study found that "a significant positive market reaction ...
followed the separation of the responsibilities of chairman and
CEO." 102 The study also found that companies that announced they
would separate the chair and CEO positions subsequently performed
better than their counterparts based on accounting measures. 103
Moreover, the study found that an announcement that a company would
be combining its chair and CEO positions resulted in ''the largest
negative market response the day after the announcement."104
Although this study involved an analysis of a relatively small sample
ofU.K. companies, its :findings support the contention that the separation
of the chair and CEO positions can result in the creation of increased
shareholder value. 105 Furthermore, the study's findings support the
contention that separating the chair and CEO positions can lead to
improved performance. 106
IV.

EXAMPLES OF TIIB EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE
PRACTICES ON SHAREHOLDER VALUE

To illustrate the possible negative consequences of inadequate
corporate governance practices on shareholder value, this part examines
the stock price effects of several recent, well-publicized examples of
management underperformance that have occurred arguably as a direct
result of inadequate corporate governance. These examples are intended
to illustrate the adverse effects that can occur when a company's
management pays inadequate attention to corporate governance issues.
This part concludes with a discussion of the recent events at General
Motors and Compaq, illustrating the positive effects that can occur when
a company's management pays attention to corporate governance issues.

JOO.

Id.

l01.

Id.

102.

Dayha et al., supra note 97, at 76.

103.
104.

Id.
Id,
Id.
Id.

105.
106.
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In presenting these examples we do not mean to suggest that all of the
problems could have been solved by inserting an independent chair or
lead director. Rather, we maintain that having an independent chair or
lead director will, over time, contribute to the creation of a culture in
which non-management directors act in an independent manner and
:fulfill their responsibilities. Such a culture is most likely to result when
the separation of the CEO and chair or designation of a lead director is
coupled with other generally accepted features of good corporate
governance, such as having a predominately outside board, establishing
an independent nominating committee that makes nominations based on
an articulated statement of director qualifications and does periodic
reviews of individual directors' performance, and imposing a retirement
age for directors and term limits on committee chairs. 107
We also do not mean to suggest that all CEOs who are also chairs
cannot be trusted and are not doing their jobs. For those who are, our
proposal will only add to their credibility and effectiveness. enabling
them to make better use of the board by increasing the likelihood that
there will be an independent chair or lead director to turn to between
meetings, who also will lead the independent directors in a candid
evaluation of the CEO~s performance and encourage open, frank, and
constructive discussion of corporate strategy.

A. Archer-Daniels-Midland
On June 27, 1995, the federal government issued subpoenas for a
criminal investigation into possible price-fixing at Archer-DanielsMidland ("ADM") to a number of the company's senior officers. 108
Federal authorities played excerpts of taped conversations, which the
authorities believed had captured ADM executives engaging in illegal
price-fixing with several of ADM's competitors, to some of the senior
officers who received subpoenas. 10!> However, none of ADM's senior
officers acknowledged any wrongdoing or agreed to cooperate in the
Federal investigation. 110 Within days, ADM received yet another
surprise: Mark E. Whiteacre, the head of its bioproducts division and
a long-time employee of the company, had been working with prosecutors and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for approximately three

107. John A. Byrne & Richard A. Melcher, The Best & Worst Boards,
Nov. 25, 1996, at 82, 104,

Bus. WK.,

108. Kurt Eichenwald, A Shareholder Rebellion: Investors Demand Answers from
Archer-Daniels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 19, 1995, at DI.
109. Id.
I IO. Id.
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years. m Moreover, during these years, Whiteacre had tape-recorded
thousands of conversations. 112
As news of the federal investigation became public, the company's
stock declined.113 While the S&P 500 gained 0.42 percent on June 28,
1995, ADM stock declined by approximately 3.33 percent and closed at
$16.44. 114 Moreover, in the three months following the accusations,
while the S&P 500 gained 7 .55 percent, ADM stock declined by an
additional 8.76 percent. 115 This resulted in ADM's shareholder wealth
decreasing by approximately $1.0 billion. 116 These events prompted
Bonnie Wittenburg, an analyst with the securities firm Dain Bosworth,
to assert that «[e]ven in the best case scenario ... there [would] be a
cloud over [ADM's] stock for the next c1;mple of years." 117
In the months after the public became aware of the federal investigation into ADM, the company~s practices became a subject of media
attention and public scrutiny. The federal government's price-fixing
probe focused on three particular ADM products: high fructose com
syrup, a sweetener used in soft drinks; lysine, a food additive; and citric
acid, a product used in everything from detergent to fruit juice. 118
Although ADM had become the subject of much attention, in the months
following the public disclosure of the antitrust probe, the company's
management "labored mightily to keep analysts and reporters at
bay. ,,119
In the following months, ADM became the subject of yet another
alleged scandal. Allegations that ADM made off-the-books payments.
which its senior management approved, began to circulate. 120 These
allegations began when ADM fired Whiteacre in August of 1995 for
allegedly embezzling $2.5 million, a figure that the company subsequent111.
112.

Id.
Id.

113. Ronald Henkoff & Richard Behar, Andreas S Mole Problem is Becoming a
Mountain, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 1995, at 58.
114. Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Library, Time Series File.
II5. Id.
tl6. William Patterson & Bartlett Naylor, Sour Dramas of Poor Corporate
Governance, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 10.
ll7. Henkoff & Behar, supra note 113, at 59.
118. Patricia Commins, Large Shareholders UJntinue to Press for Changes in ADM
Board, 1lm REUTER EUROPEAN BUS. REP., Oct 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, REUEUB File.
J19. Henkoff & Behar, supra note 113, at 58.

120.

Ronald Henkoff, Checks, Lies, and Videotape, FORTUNE, Oct 30, 1995, at 109.
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ly raised to $9.0 million. 121 In his defense, Whiteacre alleged that his
supervisors approved the disputed payments and that he did not engage
in embezzling. 122
Following the aforementioned events, ADM's management became the
subject of much criticism, which focused on ADM's corporate governance practices. A single individual, Dwayne O. Andreas, age seventyseven, had served as ADM's chair and CEO since 1972P3 Moreover,
Andreas used his position as chair and CEO to help place directors on
ADM's board who bad close ties to him. 124 ADM's seventeen member board included twelve directors with direct ties to management. 125
These twelve directors consisted of both current and former ADM
executives, two descendants of ADM founders, a relative of an ADM
executive other than Andreas, and one of ADM's outside lawyers. 126
Institutional investors and members of the media criticized ADM's
board of directors for its lack of independence. For example, Jon
Lukumnik, deputy controller for pensions for the New York City
Retirement Systems ("NYCRS"), described ADM's board as "remarkable
for its interconnections, friendships and blood ties with the chief
executive officer."127 ADM's directors included Dwayne Andreas; his
son, Michael Andreas, vice chair; James Randall, president; John
Daniels, retired chair of the board; Ralph Bruce, retired executive vice
president; and Lowell Andreas, retired president. 128 The lack of
independent directors on ADM's board prompted some critics of its
corporate governance practices to suggest that the acronym ADM
referred to "All Dwayne's Men:~129
In response to the situation~ institutional investors, who owned
approximately forty-eight percent of ADM's stock, placed an unprecedented amount of pressure on ADM. 130 Over thirty institutional
shareholders, including CalPERS~ withheld their votes with respect to the
re-election of ADM's seventeen directors. 131 Although the institutional

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Paul Menion, Cozy Board Ties H(IVe ADM in Bind: Critics Charge
Connections Hurt Credibility, CRAIN'S Cm. Bus., Aug. 7, 1995, at 3.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Commins, supra note 118.
128. Id.
129. David Snyder, Investor Assault on ADM: They Should Know Better, CRAIN'S

Cm. Bus., Nov.
130. Id.

6, 1995, at 13.

131. Shaton Walsh, ADM Chief Thwarts Hostile Sharel10/ders: Board Reelected by
More Than 80% Margin, WASH. POST, Oct 20, 1995, at Bl.
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investors' efforts resulted in the withholding of over twenty percent of
the votes, they did not affect the election's outcome. 132
ADM finally responded to these shareholders at its annual
shareholders' meeting on October 19, 1995. The meeting started rather
cantankerously. When a hostile shareholder representative tried to ask
a question, Andreas resEonded by saying, "This meeting, sir, runs
according to my rules."' 3 Later, when a representative of a pension
fund, which held more than 1.0 million shares of ADM stock, tried to
raise a question, Andreas told security personnel to turn off the
microphone. 134
After Andreas and ADM President Randall spoke, Brian Mulroney, a
former Canadian prime minister and an ADM board member, reported
on the work of a special committee, which he chaired, that was
overseeing the company's response to the antitrust investigation. 135
Moreover, Mulroney indicated that ADM would appoint a corporate
governance committee, which would be co-chaired by Ray Goldberg, a
professor of agribusiness at Harvard University, and Glenn Webb, chair
of an ADM subsidiary. il6 Mulroney also indicated that the corporate
governance committee would "review the company's corporate
governance procedures." 137
On January 3, 1996, a group of sixteen public and union pension
funds representing millions of shares of ADM stock wrote a letter to the
company's corporate governance committee and recommended that the
board be composed of a majority of independent directors and that
certain committees be "comprised of solely independent directors." 138
In mid-January, ADM's corporate governance committee came out with
its proposal recommending that ADM reduce its board size and reduce
the number of inside directors. 139 As a result of the committee's work,
Andreas indicated that more outside directors would be added to ADM's

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Walsh, supra note 131.
Id.
Nancy Millman,ADM's "AIMn-the•Family' Board Faulted: Replacements May
Be Recommended at Meeting, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1996, at Cl.
139. Scott Kilman & Joann S. Lublin, ADM Panel Recommends Sweeping Changes
in Board, WALL ST. .r., Jan. 16, 1996, at A3. See also Richard A. Melcher et al., ft Isn't
Dwayne's World Anymore, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1996, at 82.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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board and board committees at the next annual meeting. 140 Although
commentators lauded ADM for taking these steps to improve its
corporate governance practices, many commentators also criticized ADM
for failing to take all of the necessary steps, such as establishing "a
strong •tead director' as a counterweight to Andreas ...." 141
On October 15, 1996, ADM plead guilty to two criminal charges of
price-fixing and agreed to pay a $100 million dollar :fine, 142 the largest
criminal antitrust fine ever levied.143 In addition, ADM agreed to help
the government build a criminal case against two executives, Michael
Andreas and Terrance Wilson. 144 At the annual shareholder meeting
on October 17, 1996, eight board members removed themselves from the
ADM board, and three more individuals joined ADM's board. 145 As
a result, AD M's board now consists of twelve members, three of whom
are independent. 146
Although ADM has taken action to address the inadequacy of its
corporate governance practices, the ex-post nature of these actions leaves
one pondering how many of ADM's current problems could have been
avoided if it had separated its chair and CEO positions or had appointed
a lead director. Moreover, one wonders how much of ADM's shareholder wealth would have been preserved if the company had acted
proactively to ensure that its corporate governance practices provided it
with the normal checks and balances of a corporation of its size and
stature.

B. Morrison Knudsen
Unlike the board of ADM, the board of Morrison Knudsen ("l\1K."),
an engineering, construction, mining, and rail concern renowned for its
construction of the Hoover Dam and San Francisco Bay Bridge,
appeared to consist of independent outsiders, such as Peter S. Lynch;
former manager of the Fidelity Magellan Fund, and Peter V. Ueberoth,
former commissioner of major league baseball, who should have been
familiar with what shareholders expect from a public company. 147

Id.
Richard A. Melcher & Greg Bums, Archer Daniels' Cleanup: Don't Stop Now,
Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 1996, at 37. See also Byrne & Melcher, supra note 107, at 85
(ADM cited as having the worst board in the United States).
142. Melcher et al., supra note 139, at 82.
143. Three Former ADM Executives Indicted, L.A. TIMES, Dec, 4, 1996, at D3.
144. Mechler et al., supra note 139, at 82.
145. Id. at 84.
146. Id.
147. Diana B. Henriques, Ties That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity,, N.Y. TIMES,
March 21, 1995, at DI.
140.
141.
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However, events that unfolded in 1994 revealed that, like the board of
ADM, the board of MK may have benefited from the presence of a lead
director or the separation of its chair and CEO positions.
MK earned an annual profit of approximately $35.0 million in 1990,
1991, and 1993 and lost approximately $7.1 million in 1992. MK.
shocked investors when it unexpectedly lost in excess of $350.0 million
in 1994. 148 After MK. announced an unanticipated loss of approximately $40.5 million in the second quarter of 1994, 149 its stock price
plummeted by approxi:q.tately thirty percent. 150
Shortly after this unexpected announcement, MK shareholders :filed a
class action suit against the company, its CEO and Chair William J.
Agee, two other corporate officers, and its outside auditor Deloitte &
Touche. 151 The suit claimed that MK had made false and misleading
statements and misled investors about the company's future pro:fitability.152 Subsequently, shareholders filed thirteen additional ,shareholder
derivative suits against Agee and various other board members. These
suits repeated the claims alleged in the class action suit and also accused
Agee of leading MK. to financial ruin via his executive decisions and of
misappropriating corporate assets for his personal use. 153 These suits
also accused :MK's directors of abandoning their oversight responsibilities.154
In addition to significantly reducing MK's shareholders' wealth, 155
MK.'s unexpected loss in 1994 posed a significant threat to MK's future
:financial viability. To fulfill its contractual obligations, MK. required
additional sources of cash in 1995. 156 However, because of MK.'s
precarious financial condition and the possibility that it might "seek
protection from its creditors · under the United States Bankruptcy

"
148. MORRISON KNuDsEN CORP., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (1995).
149. Dan Popkey, SEC Lare UJ the Game, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 9, 1995, at SA.
150. See infra Exhibit I, APPENDIX for an analysis of MK's stock performance
relative to the S&P 500.
151. Robb Mandelbaum, Big Suits, AM. LAW., Dec. 1995, at 102.

152.

Id.

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. MK stockholders owned equity worth approximately $407.0 million at the end
of 1993. However, at the end of 1994, MK stockholders owned equity worth less than
$57.7 million. MORRISON KNUDSEN CoRP., supra note 148, at 28.
156. Id. at 20.
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Code,"157 MK.'s ability to obtain additional :financing became uncertain.
As an engineering, construction, mining, and rail concern, MK
competed with other firms for various long-term contracts. MK could
assess the profitability of many of these contracts only after performing
them. In 1994, MK.'s engineering and construction division lost in
excess of $82.0 million, MK.'s rail subsidiary lost in excess of $31.0
million, and MK.'s transit division lost in excess of $224.0 million. 158
Critics focused on the process by which MK. selected what prices to bid
for contracts because cost overruns on allegedly profitable contracts
resulted in MK.'s enormous losses. 159 Moreover, the managerial
decisions of Agee, MK's chair and CEO, also became the subject of
increasing attention. 160
MK had submitted bids for many of these long-term contracts that
were so low that MK. incurred substantial losses fulfilling its contractual
obligations. 161 MK. officially cited a decrease in new contract awards,
postponements of start-ups of previously awarded contracts, write-downs
of operating assets and investments, and provisions for anticipated losses
on uncompleted contracts as several of the sources of its loss. 162
However, others blamed Agee and accused him of intentionall,t3
underbidding certain contracts to ensure that IVIK received tbem. 1 1
For example, Agee reportedly underbid several major transit-car
contracts because he thought that doing so would enable MK to solidify
its position in this line ofbusiness. 164 MK.'s 1994 financial results and
the transit division's 1994 loss of $224.7 million revealed that Agee's
strategy had disastrous effects on the company and its shareholders. 165
Critics of Agee focused not only on his managerial decisions but also
on his personal conduct. Although Agee moved to Boise, Idaho. the
location of:MK's headquarters, in 1988, 166 he sold his Boise residence
to :tv.1K and began running the corporation from his residence in Pebble

157. Id.
158. Id. at 15-17.
159. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, William Agee: His Record of Disastrous Management
Remains Intact, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1995, at D2.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. MORRISON KNuDsEN CORP., supra note 148, at 15-16.
163. Julie Bailey, MK Acts to Isolate Transit Business, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 28,
1995, at 58.
164. Id.
165. See infra Exhibit I, APPENDIX.
166. Martin Wolk,MorrisonKnudsen Ousts Agee as Chairman, REUTER Bus. REP.,
Feb. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File.
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Beach, California, in the spring of 1994.167 Moreover, in January of
1994, the MK compensation committee agreed to increase Agee's salary
by more than $150,000 after an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") audit
of his taxes for 1990, 1991, and 1992. The m.s found that Agee should
have reported income of $56,892 for his wife's use of the MK airplane,
$99,383 for company-paid secwity systems at his houses, and $1,350 for
using a company warehouse to store personal items.168 As a result of
the absentee management, the IRS audit, and other activities, Agee
developed a reputation as "an out-of-touch executive living a lavish
lifestyle at the expense of the faltering company." 169 An editorial in
a leading Boise newspaper asked the following question: "Is MK an
international construction firm or a posh playground for the rich and
famous of Pebble Beach?"170
Toe personal relationships between many ofMK's directors and Agee
also became an issue during this time period. Nine of MK.'s eleven
directors became directors after Agee had been appointed MK.'s CEO
and chair in 1988. 171 Moreover, Agee also served as a director of MK.
Six of MK's directors had close ties to Agee via the Nurturing
Network, a tiny private charity set u~ by his wife to provide young
women with alternatives to abortion.
In addition to Agee, Gerard
Roche, an MK director, and the wives of five other outside directors had
served on the charity's board. 173 On some occasions, the charity's
board even met at the same time and location as MK.'s board. Furthermore, on some of these occasions, the boards shared intimate dinners
that spotlighted the charity's work. 174
Although personal friendships and family socializing are routine
among outside directors and CEOs, the nature of these fiiendships and
the extent of the socializing present at :MK went beyond the norm.
Lorsch stated that he was "quite surprised that there could be this kind

167. Dan Popkey, Boardroom/or Buddies, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 9, 1995, at IA.
168. Id.
169. Wolle, supra note 166.
170. MK Directors Accountable for Past Mistakes, Future Direction, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Feb. 12, 1995, at 14A.
171. Greg Heberlein, Gee, Here ls at Least I Thank You/or Bill Agee, SEATILE
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at Fl.
172. Henriques, supra note 147, at DI.
173.

Id.

174.

Id. at D4.
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of complicated arrangement going on that nobody knows about." 175
He further stated: "I have never seen a situation like this." 176
The conduct of :MK's directors also came under increasing scrutiny
after the events of 1994. 177 For example, Chief Executive cited MK.'s
board as one of America's worst corporate boards.178 The magazine
criticized :MK's board for failing to meet at :MK's corporate headquarters
for over a year and for paying excessive attention to the CEO's
compensation. 179 The magazine also criticized MK.'s board for failing
to take corrective actions as soon as they were necessary. 1so
In late 1994 and early 1995, two new outsiders, William P. Clark and
Zbigniew Brzezinski, joined MK.'s board.is, In February of 1995, with
1vlK facing immense losses and with the board galvanized by the
addition of two new directors, MK.'s board demanded and received
Agee's resignation. 182 Subsequently, in September of 1995, IvIK
settled all but one derivative suit against it. 183 Although the settlement
did not include any findings of wrongdoing by :MK or any of the
individual defendants, the settlement provided for: (1) :MK's directors'
and officers' liability insurance carriers to pay $35.0 million to plaintiffs,
(2) MK to issue over 2.9 million shares of common stock to the plaintiff
class, (3) Agee to relinquish certain contractual benefits, and (4) the
implementation of certain corporate governance procedures, including
reasonable efforts to appoint seven additional non-employee directors to
1v1K.'s board. 184 In addition to adding these non-employee directors;
MK also announced that it would separate the positions of CEO and
chair. 185

When MK announced that it would be merging with Washington
Construction Group Inc. in May of 1996, the NYSE halted trading in
1flC stock. 186 On July 9, 1996, 1v1K. filed a pre-packaged Chapter 11

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Robert W. Lear & Boris Yavitz, The Best and Worst Boards of 1995:
Evaluating the Boardroom, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1995, at 24.
178. Id.
179. MK's 1993 proxy statement ran 43 pages, 38 of which concerned the
compensation programs for Agee and other top officers. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Lear & Yavitz, supra note 177, at 24.
183. Morrison Knudsen Settles Securities, Derivative Litigation, PR NEWSWIRE,
Sept 20, 1995.
184. Id.
185. Katy Robinson, Agee Fiasco Provides Lessons for Other Businesses, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Feb. 9, 1996, at 2A.
186. Ellie Rodgers, MK's Directors Open New Era Today, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept.
12, 1996, at SB.
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bankruptcy plan. 187 Under the term of the agreement, :tvIK.'s shareholders received one warrant for every thirteen and three-tenths shares of
:tvIK. stock they owned. 188 Each warrant gave its holder the right to
purchase one share of the combined company's stock for $12 over a
period of six and one-half years. 189 The combined company assumed
the Morrison Knudsen name. 190 On September 12, 1996, shares of the
new Morrison Knudsen began trading on the New York Stock Exchange.191 They closed at $9.63 after their :first day oftrading. 192
Although MX's board ultimately took steps to address the problems
associated with its CEO and chair, and agreed to take steps that will
ultimately result in increasing the efficacy of its corporate governance
practices, it did so only after MK shareholders lost a significant amount
of their wealth. Between year end 1993 and year end 1994, :MK
shareholders lost approximately $350.0 million. 193 A shareholder who
purchased MX stock on the last trading day of 1993 and sold this stock
on the last trading day of 1994 would have lost almost 85.0% of her or
his investment. 194
The events that transpired in 1994 leave one wondering whether they
would have occurred if :MK had separated the roles of CEO and chair or
appointed a lead director at an early stage. The presence of a strong and
independent leader on the board would have certainly diminished Agee's
control over the board and may have resulted in a course of events that
would not have been so disastrous for :MK and its shareholders.

187. Morrison Knudsen Fifes for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, REurER. Bus. REP., June
25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File,
188. Ellie Rodgers, MK Bankruptcy Plan Baffles Investors, IDAHO STA1ESMAN,
Sept 23, 1996, at 5B.
189. Id.
190. Rodgers, supra note 186, at SB.
191. Id.
192. Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Libnuy, Time Series File.
193. MORRISON KNUDSEN CORP., supra note 148, at 28.
194. Id.
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C.

General Motors 195

In 1981, General Motors ("GM"), the largest American automobile
manufacturer, appointed a new chair and CEO, Roger Smith. 1% Smith
had spent his entire career at GM, having started work as a general
accounting clerk. m Soon after the board appointed him chair and
CEO, Smith began his attempt to transform GM into an automobile
industry leader through the increased use of new processes and
technology. 198 For example, between 1981 and 1985, GM spent over
$40 billion on high-technology plants equipped with the latest lasers,
computers, and robots-an amount of money that exceeded the market
valuations of Toyota and Nissan. 199
Despite these efforts to make GM increasingly competitive via
technology, the company remained noncompetitive.200 GM critics
characterized the company's new products as "unexciting, look-alike car
models."201 The "unexciting" nature of GM's new car models partially
explains why GM lost market share throughout the 1980s.202 "During
the 1980s, GM's share of North American car sales shrank to about
[thirty-five percent] from [forty-Ilve percent] as car buyers switched to
smaller, more :fuel~efficient Japanese cars."203 In addition to losing
market share, GM became an inefficient and high-cost producer.204
While GM improved its assembly efficiency by approximately five
percent in the 1980s, its two main American competitors, Ford and
Chrysler, improved their assembly efficiencies by seventeen percent and
thirty-one percent, respectively, during this same period.205 As a
result, while the S&P 500 increased by approximately 227 percent

195.

For a more detailed analysis of General Motors, see ROBERT A.G. MONKS &

NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 327-71 (1995),

196. Stan Hinden, Corporate Raiders and Company Men, WASH. POST, May 28,
1989, at XI 1.
197. Id.
198. Adam Wong, De-Robotising the Car Industry, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 9,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., S.C. Gwynne, Big Plans for Small Car; New Boss Bob Stempel Aims
to Make GM's Latest Model a Hit, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 53.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Daly & Cazzin, supra note 13, at 90.
204. MONKS & M!NOW, supra note 195, at 361.
205. Id.
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between 1980 and 1990, GM stock afil'reciated by only approximately
sixty-nine percent durin~ the decade.2
During the 1980s, GM's board had developed a reputation for being
dominated by Smitb.207 Fortune made the following observations
about Smith's interactions with the GM board;
Roger Smith kept the board on a very short leash. He withheld key financial
data and budget allocation proposals until the day before meetings and
sometimes distributed them minutes before the participants convened. The
monthly sessions were rigidly structured and Smith adjourned them promptly
at five minutes to noon, leaving little rooin for discussion. Circumstances and
personality enabled Roger Smith to exercise his iron control. Quick to anger,
he was intolerant of criticism. Few board members had the ability or desire to
take him on.2 08

By engaging in the aforementioned activities, Smith precluded GM's
board from assessing the soundness of his executive decisions.
As Smith approached retirement, the subject of who would succeed
him as GM's chair and CEO became a source of friction between GM's
management and GM's institutional shareholders.209 Traditionally,
GM's chair and CEO chose his successor long before he retired and the
former CEO retained a position on the board.2 10 However, two of
GM's largest shareholders. CalPERS and the New York State Retirement
System ("NYSRS"), wrote letters to GM's board indicating their concern
that GM's succession process was a source of its current problems.211
However, GM's directors never responded directly to the concerns of
CalPERS or NYSRS and allowed Smith basically to choose his
successor.212
In August of 1990, GM's directors elected a new CEO and Chair,
Robert Stempel.213 Stempel, who had spent his entire career at GM as
an engineer, was the first CEO of GM in over thirty years whose

206. James B. Treece, Can GM's Big Investors Get It to Change Lanes?, Bus. WK.,
Jan. 22, 1990, at 30, See infra Exhibit II, APPENDIX for a comparison of the
performance of GM versus Ford and Chrysler.
207. See, e.g., Alex Taylor III, What's Ahead for GM's New Team, FORTUNE, Nov.
30, 1992, at 59.
208. Id.
209. MONKS & MrNow, supra note 195, at 362.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Taylor, supra note 207, at 58.

213.

GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991).
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principal area of expertise involved something other than finance. 214
Although Stempel replaced Smith as GM's CEO and chair, Smith
remained a GM director. 215
After Stempel replaced Smith, the U.S. economy began to stagnate.116
Because the auto industry is a cyclical industry (i.e., an
industry in which profits rise and fall with the economy), and because
GM is a major participant in the auto industry, the economic downturn
caused GM, in Stempel's own words, to enter into a "kamikaze
dive."117 Although GM had never suffered consecutive annual losses
in its history prior to 1990, GM suffered three consecutive annual losses
between 1990 and 1992. GM lost approximately $2.0 billion in 1990,
$4.4 billion in 1991, and $23.5 billion in 1992.'"
GM's North American operations accounted for a substantial portion
of GM's unprecedented losses. 219 For example, in 1991, GM's North
American operations lost in excess of$7 .0 billion, which translates 0 into
a loss of $1.0 million every hour, every day of the year." 220 In the
early l 990s, GM's North American operations significantly lagged
behind those of their competitors in term of cost effectiveness.221
Experts attributed some of the blame for this situation to Smith's
investment in tecbnology.222 These individuals characterized GM1s
investment in technology during the Smith era as unjustifiable and
unwise. 223
Stempel unsuccessfully attempted to restore GM to profitability.224
During the early 1990s, GM launched a major workforce reduction
campaign in which it closed numerous plants and terminated thousands
of employees.225 However, these changes did not return GM to
pro:fitability.226 GM also took the following steps in the early 1990s:
(I) it issued approximately $2.4 billion in new equity, (2) it increased its
debt by approximately $2.4 billion, (3) it reduced its annual stock
MONKS & ~ow, supra note 195, at 362.
See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 213, at 52.
Joseph B. White & Paul Ingrassia, Eminence GriSe, Behind Revolt al GM.
L~er Ira Millstein Helped Call the Shots, WAu., ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at Al, AJ3,
217. Id. at AB.
218. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 54 (1994),
219. Warren Brown, GM Directors Pick Smale as Chairman, WASH. POST, Nov.
2, 1992. at Al.
220. Id.
221. Daly & Cazzin, supra note 13, at 94 ("Smith also saddled his successor with
the highest production and labor costs in the auto industry., ..").
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 218, at 54.
225. Taylor, supra note 207, at 60-61.
226. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 218, at 54.
214.
215.
216.
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dividend from $3.00 to $1.60, (4) it cut its capital spending, and (5) it
made questionable assumptions about the rate of return on its pension
fund that resulted in the fund being underfunded by approximately $17 .0
billion.221
These actions and GM's continued losses prompted institutional
investors, such as CalPERS, to increase pressure on GM's board, which
began to take on an increasingly active role in management.228 For
example, a group of GM's outside directors began to meet secretly on
the night prior to board meetings to discuss the ongoing changes at
GM. 229 On April 6, 1992, GM's board indicated its displeasure with
GM's existing management by replacing GM's president Lloyd Reuss,
the head of GM's unprofitable North American operations, with Jobn F.
("Jack") Smith, Jr., the head of GM's profitable international operations,
and by demoting Stempel from his post as chair of the executive
com.mittee.230 Moreover, the board announced that John Smale, a GM
board member and the former chair and CEO of Procter & Gamble Co.,
would assume Stempel's position as chair of the executive committee,
and that Stempel would be required to report to Smale.231
The stock market reacted positively to the board's April 6 announcement.232 After the announcement, GM's stock price increased by 3.4
percent.23:, This increase resulted in GM's shareholder wealth increasing by approximately $1.4 billion.2:w
After the April 6 announcement, Stempel continued his gradual
attempts to streamline and reform GM.235 However, newspaper articles
bad begun appearing in mid-October, first in The Washington Post and
then in other national dailies, indicating that GM's directors planned to
remove Stempel.236 On October 26, Stempel resigned.237

227. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 195, at 365.
228. See, e.g., Kathleen Kerwin et al., Crisis at GM, Bus. WK., Nov. 9, 1992, at
86.
229. Id.
230. Taylor, supra note 207, at 60.
231. Id.
232. NEW YORK STOCK ExCHAN'GE, DAILY STOCK PRICE REC. 201 (Apr., May &
June, 1991).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Taylor, supra note 207, at 58.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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The stock market reacted positively to the rumors that GM's board
would remove Stempel.238 On October 21 and 22, while the S&P
declined from 415.480 to 414.900, GM stock increased from $29.75 to
$32.88, based on the rumors that GM's board would fire Stempel.239
This increase in GM's stock price resulted in its shareholder wealth
increasing by an amount in excess of $2.0 billion.240 Moreover, on the
day of Stempel's resignation, while the S&P increased from 414.100 to
418.160 (0.98 percent), GM's shares increased from $33.50 to $34.15
(1.87 percent).241 This increase resulted in GM's shareholder wealth
increasing by about $300.0 million. 242
On November 1, 1992,243 GM's board of directors replaced Stempel
with Jack Smith, who had been GM's president since April, and Smale,
who had been chair of GM's executive committee since April. 244
GM's board appointed Smith to serve as GM's CEO and Smale to serve
as GM's chair. Smale would be GM's first non-management chair in
approximately fifty years.245
After GM's board appointed Smale chair, he began working with other
board members to improve GM's corporate governance practices to
ensure that in the future GM's board would respond quickly to
mismanagement.246 GM's 1992 annual report included the following
message from Smale: "During the past year, the General Motors board
has reexamined its processes and bas established a set of operating
guidelines which will ensure that it is performing its responsibilities with
the same discipline and dedication that it expects from managemcnt."241
In 1994, after working on the project for over a year, GM's board
publicly announced a twenty-eight-point set of guidelines on significant
corporate governance issues facing the company.248 The guidelines249 generated considerable positive publicity for GM. 250

See Grundfest, supra note 3, at 895-96.
Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Library, Time Series File.
See Grundfest, supra note 3, at 895-96.
Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Library, Time Series File.
See Grundfest, supra note 3, at 895-96.
Brown, supra note 219, at Al.
244. An analystS of the effect of this announcement on GM's market capitalization
would be difficult to perfonn because GM's board also made several other important
announcements on this day. For example, the board indicated that GM's dividend would
be reduced by 50%.
245. Brown, supra note 219, at Al.
246, GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 218, at 3.
247. Id.
248. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 10.
249. Keith Naughton,New Guidelines Prove GM's Directors Have Taken the Wheel,
DET. NEWS, March 25, 1994, at Al.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
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Although GM's guidelines do not exgress a preference as to whether
the CEO and chair should be separate, 51 they specifically provide that
if GM's board appoints a GM employee chair, then GM's outside
directors will select a lead director who "will assume the responsibility
of chairing the regularly scheduled meetings of outside [d]irectors or
other responsibilities which the outside [d]irectors as a whole might
designate from time to time." 252
In late 1995, Smale decided to retire as GM's chair.253 During his
tenure as chair, Smale had worked closely with Smith and helped
transform GM into a company that earned a profit in excess of $5.0
billion in the first nine months of 1995 from a company that lost in
excess of $23.0 billion in 1992.254 On December 4, 1995, GM's board
appointed Smith chair and once again allowed one person to serve as the
company's CEO and chair.255 However, in a move designed in part
to reassure major shareholders that GM would not return to its past
corporate governance ~ractices, GM's board named Smale the
company's lead director. 56 The following statements made by Smith
indicated that, as GM's lead director, Smale would remain active in
overseeing the company's management:
The changes announced today will pennit [Smale] to continue the leadership
role he bas played on the GM board, while pennitting bim to reduce his day-today involvement in GM's governance. The fundamental role ofGM's directors
in overseeing GM's management and affairs will continue.2..'1 7

250. Martin Dickson, Policy Codifies Power for Non-Executives-Martin Dickson
Considers General Motors' New Guidelines on the Role of Its Board of Directors, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1994, at 16 ("It has been variously hailed as a 'Magna Carta for U.S.
directors,' 'a very important corporate governance document,' and a 'very commendable
example."').
251. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 10.
252. Id.
253. Bradley A. Stertz & Daniel Howes, GM Names Smith as Chairman: Smale, 68,
Stays on as Company's Lead Director, Watchdog, DET. NEWS, Dec. 5, 1995, at AL
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. id.
257. id. See also Judith H. Dobrzynski, As He Steps Down, G.M Chairman Looks
Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1995, at D4.
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C.

Compaq Computer

Unlike ADM, MK, or GM, Compaq Computer ("Compaq"), a
designer, manufacturer, and marketer of computers for business and
professional users, has had a separate chair and CEO since the
company's inception.258 Since 1983, the year in which Compaq began
selling computers, Benjamin M. Rosen, the chair of the venture capital
firm that provided Campa~ with much of its initial funding, has served
as the company's chair.2
Rosen indicated that his venture capital
firm wanted Compaq to have a separate chair and CEO because "the
chairman does have a lot more power than just another outside director,
and when the chairman and chief executive officer are the same person,
the board is often dominated by the C.E.O."260
Between 1983 and 1991, Joseph R. Canion, Compaq's founder, served
as the company's president and chief executive officer.261 Between
1983 and 1990, Compaq performed exceptionally well. Compaq's
annual sales increased from $111.2 million in 1983 to $3.6 billion in
1990.262 Moreover, Compaq's net income increased from $4.7 million
in 1983 to $454.9 million in 1990.263 As a result, the value of the
shares owned by Compaq shareholders increased from $109.1 million in
1983 to $1.9 billion in 1990.264
In 1991, however, Compaq suffered a series of setbacks. For the first
time in its history, Compaq's annual sales decreased.265 Moreover,
because Compaq's products cost more to produce than those of many of
its competitors,266 the company's annual net income decreased by
$320.1 million in 1991.267 When Rosen, who was Compaq's chair and
a member of the board's compensation, audit, and nominating commit-

258. COMPAQ CoMPUTER CORP., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1984).
259. Id. See also Byrne & Melcher, supra note 107, at 84 (Compaq cited as having
the fourth best board in the United States).
260. Steve Lohr, Pulling Down the Corporate Clubhouse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1992, § 3, at 5.
261. COMPAQ COMPUTER CoRP., 1990 PROXY STATEMENT 2 (1990); Catherine
Arnst et al., Compaq: How It Made Its Impressive Move Out of the Doldrums, Bus.
WK., Nov. 2, 1992, at 146.
262. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP,, supra note 258 at 15; COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP.,
1990 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1991).
263. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., supra note 258, at 15; COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP.,
1990 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1991).
264. COMPAQ CoMPUTER CORP,, supra note 258, at 14; COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP,,
1990 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1991).
265. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1992).
266. Id. at 5.
267. Id. at 17.
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tees,268 became aware of the company's problems, he began to discuss
and investigate them with other board members. 269 Although Rosen
and Compaq's other board members reached the conclusion that the
company needed to undergo a significant number of changes to continue
to be successful, Compaq's management disagreed and thought that the
company was merely facing «a short term perturbation." 270
In October of 1991, after the board realized that it did not agree with
management's assessment of the situation, the board replaced Canion,
the company's popular CEO and president, with Eckhard Pfeiffer,271
who was formerly Compaq's chief operating officer and an instrumental
figure of the success of the company's European operations.272
Pfeiffer "redirected the company's product strategy, marketing strategy,
and ... cost-cutting strategy."273 After Pfeiffer implemented these
strategic changes at Compaq, the company's sales, profits, and market
capitalization significantly increased.27
Unlike its counteiparts at ADM, .MK, and GM, Compaq's board
forced management to make the changes necessary for the company to
be successful without waiting for the situation to become a crisis. As
Compaq's chair, Rosen played a significant role in the board's decision
to investigate and ameliorate the problems that resulted in the company's
disappointing sales, profits, and market capitalization in 1991. If
Compaq had allowed a single individual to serve as its CEO and chair,
frs board might not have been able to act so quickly and decisively.175

268.
269.

Id. at 52.
MONKS & MINow, supra note 195, at 159.
270. Id.
271. Following this announcement, Compaq's stock price declined by approximately
13.6% over the next two days. However, the termination announcement crune only one
day after the company announced its first-ever quarterly loss. Thomas C. Hayes,
Compaq Ousts Chief After Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at 33. Compaq's
announcement of a quarterly loss generated bad publicity regarding the company m the
following days. See, e.g., Louise Kehoe, Compaq's Ousted CEO a Scapegoat?, FIN.
POST, Oct. 29, 1991, at IO.
272. Bob Francis, Compaq's New CEO: A Focus on Price, DATAMATION, Jan. 1,
1992, at 37.
273. MONKS & MINow, supra note 195, at 159.
274. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1993).

275. For a comparison of the performance of Compaq versus IntematronaJ Business
Machines ("IBM'') and Digital Equipment (''Digital'j, see infra Exhibit III, APPENDIX.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Although it would be extreme to refer to all directors as 11nonperforming assets," the label Robert Monks used to describe the directors
of Sears, Roebuck in a full-page ad in The Wall Street Journal
recommending a vote in favor of a variety of shareholder froposals
(including one to separate the roles of CEO and chair),21 there is
clearly room for improvement in the boardroom. By requiring boards
of directors to consider on a yearly basis whether it would be desirable
to split the roles of CEO and chair or to appoint a lead director, the
adoption of our proposal would encourage CEOs and directors to focus
on the strengths and weaknesses of their board leadership structure. We
believe that many boards will conclude that there are substantial benefits
to splitting the roles or appointing a lead director. These include the
empowerment of the independent directors through the appointment of
a recognized leader who will guide their regular evaluation of the CEO
and his or her perfurmance277 and encourage free and open discussions
about current problems, practices, and strategies. Yet, our proposal
permits boards to keep a unitary CEO-chair structure without a lead
director, provided the board explains its rationale to the shareholders in
the proxy statement.
Because we believe the arguments for a separate CEO and chair or
lead director are compelling, we expect that boards providing for neither
may :find it difficult to explain their reasoning to shareholders. Unable
to defend current practice, directors may conclude that modifying that
practice is the only solution. If so, our proposal may provide the
impetus necessary to overcome CEO resistance to a change in board
leadership structure that will reduce the CEO's power over the
board.178

276. WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at A7.
277. For a useful discussion of how to conduct a successful CEO performance
evaluation, see National Association of Corporate Directors, Report of the NACD Blue

Ribbon Commission on Performance Evaluation ofChiefExecutive Officers, Boards, and
Directors 1·5 (1994). See also James E. Sailer, CEO Evaluation at Dayton Hudson,
Harvard Business School Case No. N9-491-I 16, March 28, 1991.
278. Shareholder groups in the U.K. strongly support the LSE disclosure
requirement because they believe that companies that are otherwise reluctant to comply
with the Cadbucy Report's Code of Best Practice are embarrassed into compliance by
the requirement to publicly state whether they are in compliance and, if not, why not.
Cohen. supra note 29, at 19.
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Our proposal talces full advantage of the desire of human beings to be
approved of and respected.279 Public identification of the person who
is charged with leading the independent directors will give the chair or
lead director extra incentive to avoid the embarrassment and loss of
reputational capital that will follow if the CEO runs amuck or the
company otherwise performs badly on that person's watch. In short, by
encouraging boards to select publicly identified leaders, we hope to shift
the balance of power in the boardroom from the CEO to the independent
directors, and to thereby improve corporate accountability.
We acknowledge that selectin~ a separate chair or a lead director is no
panacea for all corporate ills. 80 Even if a director is nominally
independent of the CEO, as the outside directors of Morrison Knudsen
were, social ties and the general desire to avoid being characterized as
overly contentious or disruptive cause most directors to be loathe to
challenge the CEO. RJR Nabisco, for example, had a separate
chair-Charles E. Hugel, then CEO of Combustion Engineering-but
CEO F. Ross Johnson still wasted corporate funds and tried to buy RJR
with a lowball bid.281 Nonetheless, as we saw with Compaq, having
a publicly identified leader of the independent directors increases the
likelihood that the independent directors will hold the CEO accountable
and promote such changes in corporate strategy and direction as might
be needed to avoid a crisis. Such mid-course corrections can not only
malce major loss of shareholder wealth less likely, but also prevent the
devastating dislocation to employees, communities, and suppliers that
often accompanies poor corporate performance.282
It is ironic that the United States, which in many ways started the
current corporate governance movement in 1976 with a letter from the

279. SeeTetlock, supra note 51, at 308 ("There are many reasons why people seek
the approval and respect of those to whom they are accountable, including both symbolic
psychological and tangible material rewards and punishments.''). See also the comments
of Ira Millstein in Laura Fowlie, Executive Firings a "Watershed," FJN. POST, Feb. 9,
1993, at 6 ("[fhe boards of Westinghouse, IBM, and American Express] are acting
because their reputations, their pride, their fellowship and their self respect cfemand iL").
280. See Dobrzynski, supra note 35, at 124 ("Splitting the jobs of chairman and
CEO is no panacea.'').
281. Id. See also BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE:
THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 73-74, 165 (1990).
282. For a satirical but gut-wrenching depiction of the effect of the closing of the
General Motors plant in Flint, Michigan, on former GM employees and the community,
see the film RoGER AND ME (Warner Bros. Inc. 1989).
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Chairman of the SEC to the newly appointed president of the New York
Stock Exchange, proposing that the NYSE amend its listing requirements
to require the appointment of audit committees comprised solely of
independent directors,283 has now fallen behind the U.K. and Canada.
We encourage the SEC, the NYSE, and the NASD to regain the
initiative by examining board leadership structure as well as other
aspects of corporate governance, such as how directors are selected,284
evaluated,285 and compensated.

283. Letter from Roderick M. Hills to William Batten (May 11, 1986) (on file with
authors).
284. See NACD Blue Ribbon Commission, supra note 34, at 7-14, for guidelines
on selection of directors.
285. The NACD Blue Ribbon Commission has adopted guidelines for the evaluation
of boards and directors. Id. at 15---19.
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APPENDIX

Exhibit I
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Exhibit 11
VALUE OF $100 INVESTEO IN GM, FORD, & CHRYSLER
FROM 1-1-81 TO 4-6-92 MONTHLY INDEXED
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Exhibit Ill
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